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THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Explaining Exchange Rate Behaviour 
In our last review of the World Economy we 
focused on the implications of the continued 
volatility of floating exchange rates, and in 
particular the behaviour of the US dollar, for the 
reform of the International Monetary System. This 
topic proved to be one of the main talking points at 
the recent G7 meetings in Halifax, Canada. In this 
review we attempt to explain why when nominal 
exchange rates are left free to float they are 
generally very volatile and impart a similar degree 
of volatility into real exchange rates. In particular, 
we ask the question: can economic fundamentals 
explain the exchange rate behaviour we observe in 
foreign exchange markets, or is the behaviour 
simply a reflection of ill-informed speculation (what 
used to referred to in the UK as the 'gnomes of 
Zurich' effect)? The answer to this question is 
clearly important since it will have a bearing on the 
type of policies adopted by governments wishing to 
attenuate exchange rate movements (assuming this 
is desirable) and also for individuals and companies 
who may wish to forecast the future path of 
exchange rate movements. 
The current majority view in the economics 
profession would seem to be that economic 
fundamentals are of little or no use in explaining 
exchange rate movements at forecast horizons of 
less than three years. This was the conclusion, of 
what has now become a seminal paper, of Meese 
and Rogoff,1 and their findings have been reiterated 
over the years by a number of other researchers. 
Meese and Rogoff demonstrated for the leading 
currencies (dollar-yen, dollar-mark, and 
dollar-sterling) that a wide range of 
fundamentals-based models were unable to 
outperform a naive no-change prediction; that is, the 
best prediction of the exchange rate in the next 
period (or periods up to 36 months) is simply the 
1R Meese and K Rogoff (1983), "Empirical 
Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do they 
Fit Out of Sample?", Journal of International 
Economics, 14, 3-24. 
current exchange rate (i.e. a simple random walk). 
The apparent failure of fundamentals-based models 
has led to a resurgence of interest in 
non-fundamentals-based models such as, chartism, 
speculative bubbles and market microstnicture. 
Before outlining these non-fundamental 
explanations we give an overview of the main 
fundamentals-based explanations. 
Fundamentals-based explanations of exchange 
rate volatility 
Perhaps the best known fundamentals model of 
exchange rate determination is the view which 
asserts that volatile exchange rate movements are 
the outcome of asymmetrical adjustment speeds in 
goods and asset markets. For example, we know 
that contractual agreements impart a degree of 
inertia into wage and consumer price movements, 
whereas asset prices, such as exchange rates and 
stock prices, are free to move on a 
second-by-second basis. A change in the money 
supply, which ultimately has implications for 
commodity prices, cannot affect such prices in the 
short term, and therefore will have all of its impact 
on asset prices; exchange rates tend to 'overshoot' 
their long-run equilibrium value. This overshooting 
phenomenon was first noted by Rudiger Dornbusch 
in 1976. The behaviour of the pound sterling in the 
period 1979 to 1980 and part of the US dollar 
appreciation from 1980 through to 1985 is often 
attributed to the overshooting effect. 
Such overshooting inspired volatility is paralleled, 
and perhaps reinforced, by die 'magnification' effect 
that current changes on fundamentals can have on 
the current exchange rate. Since this effect can 
occur even when consumer prices are completely 
flexible, it should be viewed as distinct from the 
overshooting effect The magnification effect occurs 
when a current change in fundamentals signals to 
agents that, say, today's increase in the money 
supply is going to produce further increases in the 
future. These expected future increases in the 
money supply will have implications for the padi of 
the exchange rate in the future which must, in turn, 
have implications for the current exchange rate; if 
they do not, some investors will be holding a 
currency which is expected to depreciate - an 
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extremely unattractive option. Of course, if the 
money supply is not expected to change in the 
future, the current exchange rate will not bear a 
magnified relationship to the current money supply. 
The magnification story can be applied, with 
suitable modification, to a whole range of different 
fundamentals such as fiscal deficits and the current 
account position. 
The other fundamentals-based stories (which are 
usually given less emphasis in the academic 
literature) are: portfolio effects which stem from the 
imperfect substitutability of different countries 
government debt - asymmetries within asset 
markets, as opposed to between goods and asset 
markets, can also produce an overshooting result; 
the ability of speculators and multinational 
companies to substitute between currencies, 
something which has been greatly facilitated by the 
liberalisation of financial markets, can also impart 
excess volatility into currencies. 
One feature of the above fundamentals-based stories 
is that although they offer explanations of excessive 
exchange rate volatility, they are nevertheless 
consistent with foreign exchange market operators 
who are rational and well-informed. However, the 
magnitude of exchange rate volatility that has been 
observed for many currencies during the recent 
float, and the apparently dismal performance of the 
fundamentals-based models, has led many to 
interpret the volatility as the outcome of 
ill-informed and irrational behaviour. 
Non Fundamentals-based explanations of 
exchange rate volatility 
One of the best known non-fundamental 
explanations for exchange rate behaviour is that of 
a speculative bubble. This concept has a long 
history in both the economics and psychology 
literatures, and has been used to explain the 
so-called tulipmania in Holland in the seventeenth 
century and also the behaviour of the shares of the 
South Sea company in the eighteenth century - the 
so called South Sea bubble. Put simply, a 
speculative bubble is a factor which is important for 
the determination of an asset price because 
everyone involved in trading the asset believes it to 
be important It may be the existence of sunspots or 
the weather pattern in Indonesia. Just as long as 
agents en masse believe it to be important then it 
will be important. However, the empirical work that 
has been conducted on speculative bubbles 
suggests that although they do indeed exist, and 
may be used, for example, to explain particularly 
long swings in exchange rates (such as the massive 
appreciation of the US dollar in the early 1980s) 
they are not sufficient to explain the general 
behaviour of exchange rates that we observe on a 
day-to-day basis. 
Technical analysis is a second non-fundamental 
explanation for the behaviour of exchange rates. 
The best known element of this approach is 
chartism which, as the title suggests, relies on 
plotting trends in exchange rates calculated in a 
variety of ways such as moving averages methods. 
It may be argued that since asset prices should have 
all relevant information discounted into them, 
chartist techniques are a perfectly rational way of 
forecasting currencies (that is, an investor need only 
concern herself with the behaviour of the price and 
not a complex array of fundamentals). However, the 
problem is that often there are fashions and fads 
regarding key technical indicators and these fads, 
unrelated to fundamentals, tend to dominate the 
behaviour of exchange rates. For example, it may 
become fashionable to believe that once a currency 
breaks through a particular resistance level it will 
appreciate (or depreciate depending on the 
resistance point) dramatically; yet this appreciation 
bears no relationship to market fundamentals. 
Perhaps the currently most fashionable 
non-fundamentals explanation of exchange rate 
behaviour is market microstructure. This view has 
become especially popular of late in the academic 
literature because of the seeming failure of 
economists to explain the fact that on each trading 
day there is a total of approximately $1 trillion of 
foreign exchange dealings on the global foreign 
exchange market. In essence, the market 
microstructure view posits that the key explanation 
for this volume is the interaction of foreign 
exchange dealers. The factor which evidently 
generates this interaction is the heterogeneity of 
expectations amongst dealers. In order to understand 
the high gross and net volumes we observe in 
exchange markets we therefore have to understand 
the causes of this heterogeneity. Is it due to 
idiosyncratic interpretations of common information 
or does it, rather, reflect the existence of important 
informational asymmetries between dealers.2 
2Answers to these types of question are 
contained in R MacDonald and I W Marsh (1985), 
"Foreign Exchange Market Forecasters are 
Heterogeneous: Confirmation and Consequences", 
mimeo, University of Strathclyde. 
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Concluding Comments 
How then do we answer the question posed at the 
beginning of this article? First, we believe that there 
are good fundamentals-based stories to explain 
exchange rate volatility, particularly those which 
take as their starting point the exchange rate as a 
forward looking asset price. Although there is, as 
we have noted, pessimism amongst the profession 
as to the usefulness of these models in forecasting 
exchange rates, recent work we have been involved 
in does in fact suggest that fundamentals can be 
used to explain exchange rate behaviour down to 
forecast horizons as short as three months.3 
Explaining exchange rates at horizons of less than 
three months seems to be the current challenge for 
exchange rate researchers. Without doubt the key to 
understanding the behaviour of exchange rates at 
these kinds of horizons is me interaction of foreign 
exchange dealers as suggested by the market 
microstructure literature. An amalgamation of a 
market microstructure approach, which captures the 
short term behaviour of exchange rates, with a 
fundamentals-based approach, which captures me 
longer term behaviour, should greatly assist those 
who need to forecast currencies and also die policy 
maker concerned about the causes and 
consequences of exchange rate volatility. 
UK MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
In the first quarter of 1995, the provisional 
estimate of GDP at market prices - 'money' GDP 
- rose by 0.9%. After allowing for inflation and 
adjusting for factor costs, GDP grew by 0.7% 
during the quarter, compared with the 0.8% increase 
recorded in the fourth quarter of 1994. Over the 
year to the first quarter, 'real' GDP is estimated to 
have risen by 3.7%. When oil and gas extraction 
are excluded 'real' GDP is estimated to have risen 
by 0.6% in the fourth quarter and by 3.5% over the 
same period a year ago. 
Output of the production industries in the first 
3See, for example, R MacDonald and M P 
Taylor (1993), "The Monetary Approach to the 
Exchange Rate: Rational Expectations, Long-Run 
Equilibrium, and Forecasting", Staff Papers of the 
International Monetary Fund, 40, 89-107, and R 
MacDonald and I W Marsh (1995), "On Casselian 
PPP, Cointegration and Exchange Rate 
Forecasting", mimeo, University of Strathclyde. 
quarter is provisionally estimated to have risen by 
0.1%, with output rising by 4.2% compared with 
the same period a year ago. Within production, 
manufacturing experienced a decrease in output of 
0.1%, output of the other energy and water supply 
industries fell by 1.8%, and production of oil and 
gas rose by 3.1%. Manufacturing output in the first 
quarter was 3.4% above the same period a year ago. 
The output of the service sector is provisionally 
estimated to have risen by 0.9% in the first quarter 
and by 3.7% over the first quarter 1995. 
The CSO's coincident cyclical indicator for April 
1995, which attempts to show current turning points 
around the long-term trend, continued to rise. The 
index has been steadily rising since July 1992, 
suggesting an upturn in the spring/summer of that 
year. The shorter leading index, which attempts to 
indicate turning points about six months in advance, 
fell in April 1994 and has been generally falling 
since October 1994. The longer leading index, 
which purports to indicate turning points about one 
year in advance, fell again in April continuing the 
decline since June of last year. 
In the first quarter of 1995, real consumers' 
expenditure fell by 0.1% after rising in successive 
quarters in 1994. Spending during the first quarter 
rose by 1.3% on the same period a year earlier. 
The provisional official retail sales volume figures 
seasonally adjusted for May 1995, were 0.2% 
above the April figure. Over die year to May, the 
volume of sales rose by 1.1%. Taking the three 
months to May, the volume of retail sales rose by 
0.2% and by 1.3% over the same period a year 
earlier. 
The underlying determinants of consumers' 
spending appear broadly unchanged. There appear 
to be no consumer credit figures after the December 
data discussed in the March Commentary. The 
saving ratio fell in the fourth quarter 1994 to 
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10.3% from 10.6% in the third quarter. The 
underlying increase in average weekly earnings in 
the year to April 1995 is provisionally estimated to 
have been 3.5%, unchanged from March and 
February, and down from the 3.75% recorded 
consecutively in the 8 preceding months. Real 
personal disposable income is estimated to have 
risen by 0.5% in the fourth quarter 1994 to a level 
1.% higher than in the same period in 1993. 
General government final consumption rose by 
0.6% in the first quarter 1995. Government 
consumption in the first quarter was 1.6% higher 
than in the corresponding quarter of 1994. 
Real gross fixed investment or Gross domestic 
fixed capital formation rose by 1.8% in the first 
quarter to a level 2.4% higher than in the first 
quarter 1994. 
Turning to the balance of payments, the current 
account for the fourth quarter 1994 was, after 
seasonal adjustment, in surplus to the tune of 
£0.6bn, compared to revised estimates of a surplus 
of £1.4bn in the third quarter and deficits of £0.7bn, 
and £1.4bn in the second and first quarters, 
respectively. The surplus on invisible trade stood 
at £3.6bn, an increase over the £3.2bn recorded in 
the third quarter, the £1.7bn surplus in the second 
quarter, and the £l.9bn surplus in the first quarter. 
On visible trade, the fourth quarter deficit stood at 
£2.9bn compared with £l.8bn in the third quarter, 
£2.4bn in die second quarter and £3.3bn in the first 
quarter. The surplus on the oil account rose from 
£952m in the third quarter to £1068m in the fourth 
quarter. 
UK LABOUR MARKET 
Employment and Unemployment 
UK claimant unemployment fell by 48,900 in the 
quarter to May 1995. Total unemployment is now 
2^17,800, giving an overall unemployment rate of 
8.3%, with a male and female rate of 11.2% and 
4.5% respectively. UK unemployment has now 
been falling for 21 months in succession. However, 
the rate of decline in the first five months of 1995 
is lower than was registered in the last quarter of 
1994, and the fall in May was only 10,000. The 
reduction in unemployment has been accompanied 
by rather erratic movements in the number of 
unfilled vacancies which actually declined in the 
month of May, though they did increased by 3.7% 
in the quarter to May. The figure for total UK 
employment in March 1995 is 25,586,000, a 
reduction of 14,000 (0.1%) in the quarter from 
December 1994, though an increase of 75,000 
(03%) in the six months from September. UK 
employment in manufacturing showed an increase 
of 0.4% in the three months to March however in 
all other sectors of the economy employment fell. 
Also the more up to date figures for British 
manufacturing employment show a 0.2% fall in 
April. While the strong employment performance 
in the second half of 1994 seemed to indicate a 
clear recovery in the UK labour market, the latest 
employment and unemployment figures cast doubt 
on this. 
Earnings and Productivity 
In April, overall underlying annual wage inflation 
stood at 3.5%. For the last two years the annual 
wage inflation figure has remained very stable, 
lying within die 3-4% band. There continues to be 
a large differential between the manufacturing and 
service sectors wage increases. In the quarter to 
April 1995 the underlying year-on-year increase in 
wages in services was 2.75%, whilst the same 
figure for manufacturing was 5%. The rate of 
growth of labour productivity in the whole economy 
continues to be high. In the fourth quarter of 1994 
productivity was 3.5% up on the level for the same 
quarter of 1993. However, whilst productivity 
growth in manufacturing was particularly marked in 
1994, the figures for the first quarter of 1995 show 
a fall in productivity for mat quarter, although it is 
still 3.3% higher than for the first quarter of 1994. 
The result is that manufacturing experienced an 
increase in unit labour costs, compared to the 
previous year, and in April was 2.4% higher than 
for the same month in 1994. For die whole 
economy, the most up to date figures are for the 
fourth quarter of 1994 where unit labour costs 
showed a very slight decline from dieir value of the 
previous year. 
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UK OUTLOOK 
The recently published minutes of the May meeting 
between the Chancellor and the Governor of the 
Bank of England illustrate the general uncertainty 
about the strength of domestic activity and the 
prospects for inflation. The Governor took the view 
that the whole economy was continuing to grow 
above trend, although less rapidly than in the first 
half of 1994. Cost pressures remained, but, apart 
from manufacturing labour costs, had not 
deteriorated much in first quarter of the year. 
Moreover, the Governor noted that there were 
indications that the pressure to pass on cost 
increases, particularly in tradeable goods sectors, 
remained strong and was perhaps intensifying. In 
addition, the continuing weakness of sterling would 
add to that pressure exacerbating retail price 
inflation. The Bank considered that against this 
background the inflationary risk was substantial 
warranting a further 0.5% point increase in base 
rates. 
The Chancellor took a more relaxed view. There 
was clear evidence that growth was slowing down 
to a more sustainable rate. Manufacturing output 
had shown little growth since September. Retail 
sales growth had been very restrained over the 
previous six months. The apparent stronger growth 
of the service sector overall was not supported by 
anecdotal evidence and the introduction of the 
National Lottery may have been responsible for a 
one-off increase in quarterly growth by about 0.1% 
points (without changing the level of spare capacity 
in the country). Moreover, the housing market 
remained subdued. In the Treasury's view, the data 
indicated little sign of demand-led inflationary 
pressures. The Treasury acknowledged that there 
were "some worrying signs" of continued cost 
pressures, particularly on the input side, and the 
effect of a weaker exchange rate had to be taken 
into account. But, on a broad assessment of all the 
economic data, and given that interest rates had 
been raised three times since September 1994 and 
that further tax increases had taken effect in April, 
the Chancellor was not convinced that interest rates 
should be raised in May. 
The decision not to raise rates ran against market 
expectations. Nevertheless, as the Chancellor 
himself noted at the Monthly Meeting, the financial 
markets have tended to over-estimate the level of 
interest rates required to meet the Government's 
inflation target Considerable uncertainty remains. 
The growth of manufacturing output appears to be 
weakening and there are fears that the contribution 
of net trade to output growth may be slackening 
sharply. Both labour and housing markets remain 
subdued. The latest CBI Distributive Trades survey 
suggests that the high street was weaker in May 
than in April. And the two of the CSO's leading 
indicators are continuing to fall suggesting that the 
UK economy may be emulating the slowdown in 
the US. To be set against these data is the recent 
evidence that the underlying rate of factory-gate 
inflation in May was at a four-year high as 
manufacturers passed on earlier cost increases to 
their customers through higher prices. However, 
input prices - for fuel and raw materials - in May, 
remained fairly stable, rising by 0.2%. This was the 
smallest rise since October and much smaller than 
the increase of 1.5% recorded in May 1994. 
So, against this mixed picture there would not 
appear to be a strong case for a further rise in rates 
in the immediate future, although pressures for 
higher rates are likely to remain. 
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